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Caste-Politics in Bihar: in Historical Continuum  
 
Abstract 
 
This article provides a long-term narrative of movements for social change in Bihar, 
precipitated by the steady rise to political power by the backward classes/castes in the 
state, since 1989. Locating this moment in a longer momentum of struggle since 1920s, it 
probes the antecedents of recent social change in Bihar politics. Contextualising this 
process within a long recessional, it traces a larger democratic cycle of empowerment 
going back to early 20th century. The article attempts this historicisation of Bihar politics 
by drawing upon a variety of sources – from official records to newspapers – and 
supplementing them with relevant secondary literature.  
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Introduction 
 
Movements for social change in Bihar have endured for longer than popularly perceived 
and their ‘changing contours’ require a historical narrative as well as an ethnographic 
analysis.1 Personified by Lalu Prasad Yadav since 1990, their electoral emergence were 
earlier regarded as representing a ‘new phase’.2 Lately, it has been proffered as the 
product of a ‘state formation that produced structures of power and identity within which 
a caste-based politics democratically captured the state in order to systematically weaken 
it’.3 In India, where caste remains omnipresent and omnipotent, ‘interrogating’ it has 
dominantly been anthropological and sociological,4 the Republic of Bihar included.5 
Older accounts of caste in Bihar politics were framed in binaries of social stagnation or 
economic growth,6 while newer works juxtapose the categories of democracy and 
                                                 
1 Like that done for Muslim Politics in Bihar by Mohammad Sajjad, Muslim Politics in Bihar (Routledge 
India, 2014) and Papiya Ghosh, Muhajirs and the Nation: Bihar in the 1940s (Routledge, 2010). 
2 Ghanshyam Shah (ed.) Caste and Democratic Politics in India (Anthem Press, 2004), chapter 13 titled 
‘New Phase in Backward Caste Politics in Bihar, 1990-2000’ by Sanjay Kumar. See Sankarshan Thakur, 
The Making of Laloo Yadav: The Unmaking of Bihar (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000). 
3 See Jeffrey Witsoe, Democracy against Development: Lower-caste Politics and Political Modernity in 
Postcolonial India (University of Chicago, 2013), pp. 10, 20.  
4 See G. S. Ghurye, Caste and Race in India and Caste and Class in India (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 
1932, 1957), M. N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), Louis 
Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (1966), Rajni Kothari, Caste in Indian Politics (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 
1973), Dipankar Gupta, Interrogating Caste (New Delhi: Penguin, 2000), Kancha Ilaiah, God as Political 
Philosopher: Buddha’s Challenge to Brahminism (Calcutta: Samya, 2001), Sudha Pai, Dalit Assertion and 
the Unfinished Revolution: The BSP in UP (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent 
Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India (CUP, 2003) and Gail Omvedt, Understanding 
Caste: From Buddha to Ambedkar and Beyond (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2012). Exceptions being 
Ishita Banerjee-Dube (ed.) Caste in History (OUP, 2010), Anupama Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and 
the Politics of Modern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009) and, Badri Narayan, The 
Making of the Dalit Public in North India: UP, 1950-Present (OUP, 2016). 
5 See Arvind Das, Republic of Bihar (1992), especially pp. 18-38. Exception being Papiya Ghosh, 
Community and Nation: Essays on Identity and Politics in Eastern India (OUP, 2008). 
6 See A. N. Sharma and Shaibal Gupta, Bihar: Stagnation or Growth (South Asia Books, 1987).   
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development.7 In the writings of Harry Blair on Bihar, spanning from early-1970s to 
1990s, one can see the entire gamut. Starting from talking about caste as a ‘differential 
mobiliser’ to tracking the consequent ‘social change’ and studying contemporary political 
behaviour of castes to establishing their electoral support, Blair produced a corpus on the 
intersection of caste and politics and called it Bihariana.8 In the last decade, land, 
religion, conflict management, government transfers and the Naxal struggle have 
provided various entry-points into Bihar’s present political pathologies.9 Simultaneously, 
Lalu Prasad Yadav and, his successor, Nitish Kumar have seen books written on them in 
attempts to understand the state’s unmaking and making through their making and 
remaking, respectively.10                   
 
On the other hand, when one turns towards the existing relevant literature in Hindi, one 
finds works, singular in their scope, intense in their content and sweeping in their 
treatment of time. Vikas Kumar Jha wrote an exhaustive volume on the post-
Independence politics of Bihar titled Satta ke Sutradhar (‘The Narrators/Protagonists of 
Power’, Delhi: D. K. Publishers, 1996). His other book, Bihar: Rajniti ka Apraadhikaran 
(‘Criminalisation of Politics in Bihar’, Delhi: D. K. Publishers, 1991) was a smaller 
volume. Then, there are the three definitive works of Prasanna Kumar Chaudhary and 
Shrikant: Bihar mein Samajik Parivartan ke Kuch Aayaam (‘Some Aspects of Social 
Change in Bihar’, New Delhi: Vani Prakashan, 2001), Swarg par Dhawa: Bihar mein 
Dalit Aandolan 1912-2000 (‘The Dalit Revolution in Bihar 1912-2000’, New Delhi: Vani 
Prakashan, 2005) and Bahi Dhaar Triveni Sangh Ki: Bihar mein Samajik Nyaya ka Pehla 
Sangharsh (‘Triveni Sangh: The First Institutional Struggle for Social Justice in Bihar’, 
Patna: Loktantra Prakashan, 1998), respectively. 
 
Following in their wake and drawing upon state archives and provincial newspapers, 
particularly The Indian Nation and The Searchlight, this article attempts to frame a rather 
known story in a longer context. At the heart of the caste ‘politics’ from 1990 lay the 
caste ‘structure’ of old – ‘local relations of dominance and subordination’ – that led to a 
‘“territorial democracy” of caste empowerment’.11 Bihar politics has often been 
                                                 
7 Witsoe, Democracy against Development.  
8 See Harry Blair, ‘Ethnicity and Democratic Politics in India: Caste as a Differential Mobilizer in Bihar’, 
Comparative Politics 5, 1 (October 1972), 107-127, ‘Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social 
Change in the Late 1970s’, EPW 15, 2 (1980), 64-74 and ‘Electoral Support and Party Institutionalization 
in Bihar: Congress and the Opposition, 1977-1985’ in Richard Sisson and Ramashray Roy (eds.) Diversity 
and Dominance in Indian Politics: Changing Bases of Congress Support, Volume 1 (New Delhi: Sage, 
1990), pp. 123-167.   
9 See Radhakanta Barik, Land and Caste Politics in Bihar (New Delhi: Shipra, 2006), J Albert 
Rohrabacher, Bihar and Mithila: The Historical Roots of Backwardness (Routledge, 2017), Manish Jha and 
Pushpendra, ‘Governing Caste and Managing Conflicts: Bihar, 1990-2011 (Calcutta Research Group, 
2012), Himanshu Kumar and Rohini Somanathan, ‘Caste Connections and Government Transfers: The 
Maha Dalits of Bihar’ (DSE, 2015) and G. J. Kunnath, ‘Becoming a Naxalite in rural Bihar: Class struggle 
and its Contradictions’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 33: 89-123.  
10 See Arun Sinha, Nitish Kumar and the Rise of Bihar (Delhi: Penguin, 2011) and Sankarshan Thakur, 
Single Man: The Life and Times of Nitish Kumar of Bihar (2014) and the Brothers Bihari (HarperCollins, 
2015).   
11 Jeffrey Witsoe, ‘Territorial Democracy: Caste, Dominance, and Electoral Practice in Postcolonial India’, 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (May 2009), pp. 64-83. 
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characterised by fragile institutions of liberal modernity, indeterminate political 
personalities, populist discourse, corruption and criminal activities. It arguably began 
with ‘the British never manage [ing] to establish more than a “Limited Raj”’.12 
‘Institutional decay’ in Bihar emerged with the two-decade rule of the Indian National 
Congress after the transfer of power (1947-67),13 was exacerbated by the crises, excesses 
and emergency of the following decade (1967-77) as well as the populist response to it 
led by Jayaprakash Narayan (in 1974-75), and arrived at a critical point with the 
subsequent widening of social and religious divides within the north Indian society 
(1986-89).14 At the turn of the 1990s, the question for Bihar was the age-old one: does it 
‘need a society derived from political power or politics derived from social fabric’?15 As 
the Bihar District Gazetteer from 1970 offered: 
 
The Rajas, the big Zamindars, the Chairman of Local Bodies, Government Pleaders and 
Public Prosecutors mattered most. The businessman got scant notice and the common man 
was seldom thought of…The middle classes sponsored many social and educational 
institutions…The caste played a great role in society.16  
 
1920s and 1930s: the Janeyu Movement and the Triveni Sangh 
 
In Francine Frankel’s vivid words, in Bihar, ‘Brahmins, Bhumihars and Rajputs held 
sway over society for at least one thousand years’ until challenged by the ‘Upper 
Shudras, the Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris’.17 Among Muslims, the highest ranked were 
‘Ashrafs, including Saiyads, Sheikhs and Pathans – landowning classes’ – followed by 
the Razil or ‘labouring people’. Together with each other and the Kayasths, these groups 
formed the ‘respectable’ people against the rest, ‘from the Ahirs, the [Momins]…to the 
Chamars, Julahas…’18 Politically, Bihar Kayastha Provincial Sabha (1889), Bihar 
Landholders Association, Bihar Provincial Muslim League (1908) and Gopajatiya Sabha 
(1909), and later, Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee, All-India Yadav Mahasabha 
(1923) and Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha (1929), were vehicles of these forces.  
 
The corresponding economic matrix was headed by the landlord and followed by his 
tenants, and therein emerged a four-fold churning of/by: (a) social categorisation, (b) 
agrarian distress, (c) socio-religious reform and (d) national freedom movement. An 
undertow of caste mobilisation and organisation, propped up each of these. Colonialism 
gave it a new character by consecrating the old and contributing to the new identities but 
this too was an intervention, and not an invention, by the Raj and thus has long outlasted 
                                                 
12 Francine R. Frankel, ‘Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social 
Order’ in Frankel and Rao, M.S.A. (ed.) Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social 
Order (Vol. I) (Delhi: OUP, 1989), pp. 57, 62. 
13 For the 1937-39 Congress ministry see Vinita Damodaran, Broken Promises: Popular Protest, Indian 
Nationalism and the Congress Party in Bihar, 1935-46 (OUP, 1992). 
14 See Neil A. Englehart, Sovereignty, State Failure and Human Rights: Petty Despots and Exemplary 
Villains (Taylor & Francis, 2017), chapter 6, ‘Bihar: The Privatization of Violence’, p. 133.  
15 Vikas Kumar Jha, Rajniti ka Apraadhikaran (Delhi: DK Publishers, 1991), p. 40. 
16 Bihar District Gazetteer (1970), p. 102. 
17 Frankel, ‘Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order’, p. 46. 
18 Ibid. p. 55. 
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it.19 Then, there was the national freedom movement, which launched, intensified and/or 
suppressed regional, social movements. While it cohered the elites, it did not determine, 
nor desire, a social reconstruction and entrenched a caste politics of ‘exclusion’. 
 
Against this backdrop, the process of backward or lower-caste empowerment began with 
the Janeyu Andolan, which saw the Yadavs and other lower castes sanskritising 
themselves by wearing the Brahmanical thread, through the early years of the 1920s. This 
led to counter-measures by the Brahmans and there were violent as well non-violent 
encounters between peasants of the Yadav, Kurmi and Koeri castes and their upper-caste 
adversaries.20 The Janeyu Movement reached its apogee between 1921 and 1925. This 
was the first modern milestone on the long road to mobility. It provided the Yadavs with 
a social-cultural legitimacy, which paved a political path. Yadavs, also known as Goalas 
and Ahirs, were/are the most numerous caste in Bihar. They were ‘cultivators of all 
kinds’ and also ‘herdsmen and milkmen’.21 Kurmis and Koeris too were among the ‘great 
cultivating castes of Bihar’.22 Koeris were also known for being ‘skilful and industrious 
cultivators’, ‘the best tenants’ and ‘market-gardeners of Bihar’.23  
 
During the period of the aforementioned five years both north and south Bihar, excluding 
Chota Nagpur area, were affected. Confrontations took place in twenty villages of the 
districts of Patna and Munger of central-south Bihar and Darbhanga and Muzaffarpur in 
north Bihar. Simultaneously, a Momin movement ‘challenged the dominance of Syeds, 
Sheikhs and Pathans’.24 Like ‘other organisations of the oppressed social groups, such as 
the Kisan Sabha, Yadav Mahasabha, Triveni Sangh etc., the Momin Conference also 
emerged mainly from Bihar’.25 M. N. Srinivas, relying on the Census of the India Report 
for 1921, referred to the violent reaction of upper-caste men in north Bihar against the 
Yadavs’ attempts at sanskritisation.26 The Census Reports ascribe the attempt of lower 
castes at social uplift to the efforts of their respective caste sabhas. They emphasise the 
socio-economic oppression of the lower-caste peasants in general and the Yadavs in 
particular by the landlords of upper-castes as the root cause for violent upsurge.27 F. G. 
Bailey observed: 
 
                                                 
19 See Surinder Jodhka, ‘Caste: Why does it still matter?’ in Knut Jacobsen (ed.) Routledge Handbook of 
Contemporary India (2015), pp. 243-56.   
20 File No. 171 (1925), Political (Special), Government of Bihar Archives, Patna. Cited in Hetukar Jha, 
‘Lower Caste Peasants and Upper Caste Zamindars in Bihar (1921-1925): An Analysis of Sanskritization 
and Contradiction between the Two Groups’, Indian Economic and Social History Review (15: 4), October-
December 1977, pp. 550-55. 
21 W. G. Lacey, Census of India, 1931, Volume VII, Bihar and Orissa, Part II, pp. 136-7; P. C. Tallents, p. 
294, Bihar State Archives, Patna. 
22 Ibid; L. S. S. O’ Malley, Census of India, 1911, Vol. V, Bengal-Bihar-Orissa, Part I, p. 512, Bihar State 
Archives, Patna. 
23 L. S. S. O’ Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers, 1907, p. 37, 40, 105 (Darbhanga-Muzaffarpur-Gaya), 
Bihar State Archives, Patna. 
24 Paul Brass, 1974, p. 247. 
25 Sajjad, Muslim Politics in Bihar, p. 28. 
26 M. N. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India, pp. 16-17. 
27 P. C. Tallents, Census of India, 1921, pp. 236-7, Bihar State Archives, Patna. 
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The acquisition of substantial wealth by the two dominant castes led to investment in land, 
for land is still the best investment and without it a man has no prestige. They followed this 
by Sanskritizing their customs and rituals in order to raise their position in the caste system.28  
 
Bihar in this period was economically barely developed barring the southern, industrial 
region of Jamshedpur, and agriculture remained primitive. Society was in the pre-
capitalist stage and class interests did not achieve full economic articulation. Economic 
elements were inextricably linked to socio-political and cultural-religious factors. Action 
against socio-economic oppression in Bihar was thus imbricated with the promotion of 
caste interests. Historian Ramakrishna Mukherjee, among others, has shown this 
contradiction between upper castes/class and lower caste/class.29 It was the ‘caste 
orientation and not class orientation that dominated at the manifest level’,30 and, fed a 
clash between the upper elite dominated national freedom movement and the social 
movement of agricultural communities and backward castes. In Bihar, like at elsewhere 
but especially so, the defaulting, exclusive upper-middle classes/elites did not engage 
with the socio-political and cultural-economic aspirations of the lower castes and ex-
communicated their attempts to politicise these.31  
 
Against this backdrop of ‘planter-zamindar-government alliance’, confronted by Gandhi 
in Champaran in 1917, Swami Vidyanand in Darbhanga in 1919 and Sahajanand 
Saraswati in 1930s, it is instructive to remember the first consolidated political attempt at 
social equality made by the Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris, the three landed castes among 
backward castes, seventy years ago. This was the Triveni Sangh, the organisational result 
of the Janeyu movement.32 Born on 30 May 1933 in Kargahar village of Shahabad 
district, Triveni Sangh was the first step to consolidate and produce a comprehensive 
political ideology for the backwards out of their various caste-based legends and myths. 
The Congress, which had been afflicted by caste factionalism and manoeuvring since the 
early 1920s, was proving inadequate in reflecting the growing ambitions of the backward 
castes and lower middle classes. Triveni Sangh was the first attempt to apply independent 
political pressure and form an autonomous political party in opposition to the indifference 
of Congress to upper-caste domination.33  
 
It should have provoked introspection in the Congress as to why those castes that formed 
the largest proportion of state’s population and their representatives were absent from its 
leadership. But, as the tallest Congressman in Bihar, Rajendra Prasad, wrote, ‘orthodoxy 
reigned supreme among the Hindus’.34 Given the way the Kayasths politically dominated 
the Congress, the Bhumihars and the Brahmins dominated organisations like the Kisan 
                                                 
28 F. G. Bailey, Caste and the Economic Frontier (OUP, 1958), p. vii. See Harold Gould, ‘Sanskritization 
and Westernization: A Dynamic View’, Economic Weekly, Volume 13 (June 24, 1961), pp. 945-50. 
29 Ramakrishna Mukherjee, the Dynamics of a Rural Society (1957), pp, 99-100. 
30 See Jha, ‘Lower Caste Peasants and Upper Caste Zamindars in Bihar (1921-1925)’.  
31 See Ashwani Kumar, Community Warriors: State, Peasants and Caste Armies in Bihar (Anthem Press, 
2008). 
32 Sumita Mishra, Grassroot politics in India (Mittal, 2000), p. 21. 
33 William Pinch, Peasants and Monks in British India (University of California Press, 1996), pp. 134-36. 
34 Rajendra Prasad, Autobiography (first published, 1949), p. 24 
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Sabha,35 it was inevitable for an organisation to emerge, which would confront and cast a 
long shadow.36 After all, not one person of the lower castes was a member of the Bihar 
Pradesh Congress Committee between 1934 and 1946.37  
 
That though did not deter the launch of the ‘bakasht struggles’ of the Kisan Sabha, with 
its estimated 250, 000 members, and spurred the formation of Bihar Provincial Khet 
Mazdoor Sabha by Jagjivan Ram in 1937.38 Thirty-five years later, analysing the poll 
prospects of different parties before the elections of 1972, an editorial in The Searchlight 
wrote: ‘Caste, like sex, is the Freudian instinct in Bihar where everything – particularly 
politics – veers around it’.39 Thus, much before Lalu Prasad Yadav, Congressmen like S. 
K. Singh (1887-1961), M. P. Sinha (1900-71), A. N. Sinha (1887-1957) and K. B. Sahay 
(1898-1974) had been great purveyors of caste identity politics. The decades of from the 
1930s to 1960s saw deep factionalism and fragmentation within Congress.40 Its 
‘leadership’ was a ‘function of coalescence brought in a musical-chair game amongst the 
caste-based factions of the party’.41 Brahmans, Rajputs, Bhumihars and Kayasthas 
commanded over 40% of Congress legislators from 1952 to 1962 and controlled ‘vote-
banks’ of the Scheduled Castes and the Muslims, ‘inclined to be docile [and] 
appendages’.42 Bihar State Backward Classes Federation (1947), its Hindi weekly, 
Pichara-Varg, universal adult suffrage (1950, 1952), the Government of India’s 
Backward Classes Commission (1953), with its report (1955) were the key milestones of 
the politics of caste, at this time. The stymied Bihar Land Reforms Act (1950) did 
produce a ‘new class of people’ from among the occupancy tenants and would contribute 
in giving a ‘death blow to the traditional social pyramid’,43 albeit by developing a 
‘patronage network’, linking a ‘caste alliance’.44    
 
Socialists, Naxalites/Maoists and the Politics of Caste 
 
The emergence of Socialists as the major opposition power in Bihar occurred against this 
aforementioned ‘cultural crisis’, existing within and emanating from the Congress.45 
There emerged an ideology, which significantly influenced the emerging middle-classes 
among the backward castes and their rise as a political power. Subsequently, almost all 
parties reflected a socialist and populist creed. However, to adapt George Bernard Shaw, 
this ‘social revolution’ in Bihar, ‘did not end tyranny; it merely shifted the burden to 
other shoulders’. After separating from the Congress in 1948, the Socialists had to face a 
                                                 
35 See Arvind Das, ‘Peasants and Peasants Organisations: The Kisan Sabha in Bihar’ in Das (ed.) Agrarian 
Movements in India: Studies on 20th century Bihar (London: Frank Cass, 1982), pp. 40-87. 
36 Kalyan Mukherjee, ‘Peasant Revolt in Bhojpur’, EPW, Volume 14, No. 36 (1979), pp. 1536-1538. 
37 Frankel, ‘Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order’, p. 73. 
38 Ibid. pp. 78-81. 
39 The Searchlight, Sunday March 5, 1972, Page 3. 
40 See Paul Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics (Chanakya, 1984) and Sadhna Sharma, State 
Politics in India (Mittal, 1995), pp. 91-117. 
41 https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.131368/2015.131368.State-Politics-In-India_djvu.txt  
42 Frankel, ‘Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order’, pp. 82-3. 
43 Bihar District Gazetteer, Patna 1957, p. 102. 
44 Blair, 1984, p. 62. 
45 See K. K. Sharma, Agrarian Movements and Congress Politics in Bihar (Anamika, 1989) and Jawaid 
Alam, Government and Politics in Colonial Bihar, 1921-1937 (Mittal, 2004). 
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two-fold struggle of establishing their separate political and ideological identity as well as 
consolidating their social base. This was met by the uncompromising Dr. Ram Manohar 
Lohia (1910-67) and the malleable Jayaprakash Narayan (1902-79), in their own ways, 
after the 1952 electoral debacle and the consequent difficult years.46 Within his ‘New 
Socialism’, Lohia retained Liberal Populism and Gandhism but replaced Marxism with 
his own understanding (since called ‘Lohia-ism’), which linked the continuing caste and 
social-assertion movements of the backwards with the socialists.47 In so doing he 
recognised a home-truth of Bihar Politics, as The Indian Nation re-affirmed fifty years 
ago: ‘The general impression is that almost everyone is casteist’.48 
 
To build a powerful opposition to Congress, Lohia decided to turn to the backward caste 
agricultural groups as his political base. The rising groups within the backward castes 
were also looking for a party that could represent their political ambitions. It was here 
that Lohia’s slogan, ‘pichhda pave sau mein saath’ [‘60% benefits to the 
backwards/downtrodden’], was popularised by Karpoori Thakur, the emerging Socialist 
leader from the lower Shudra nai or barber caste: ‘Socialists ne bandhi gaanth’ 
[Socialists have given their pledge]. Lohia also launched the comprehensive idea of ‘sapt-
kranti’ (seven-fold revolution) bringing together the issues of social exploitation with 
racial, national, sexual questions and linking them with the imagery triad of ‘vote-spade-
jail’ thereby attempting to consolidate the anti-Congress forces. Another initiative was 
the anti-English emphasis of the Socialist’s language policy, which emotionally resonated 
with the youth and the students of the north Indian backward-agricultural castes.49 In 
August 1965, the Socialists led the largest post-independence popular movement in Bihar 
on the issues of fee-increase in educational institutions, food crises, inflation and the 
corruption of the Congress government. 1966 followed with the devaluation of rupee 
leading to an unprecedented inflation. Bihar suffered famine and lawlessness. A new, 
post-independence generation was coming into its own and decidedly breaking away 
from the Congress, being thwarted by the vested status quo of the Grand Old Party.50  
 
The 1967 elections were held against this background ending Congress’ two-decade long 
electoral domination and a ‘non-Congress government was formed with tremendous 
goodwill…drawn from [different] political parties’.51 The number of Congress’ 
Scheduled Caste MPs, for the first time, was reduced to about half of the reserved seats 
for them (23/45). The rest went to different political parties including 13 to Socialists and 
Communists. After the fall of this Samvid Sarkar (SVD ministry) of Mahamaya Prasad 
Sinha and Karpoori Thakur, followed by the ministries of B. P. Mandal – ‘the first person 
                                                 
46 See Yogendra Yadav, ‘What is living and what is dead in Rammanohar Lohia?’ EPW, Volume XLV, 
Number 40 (October 2, 2010): 92-107 and Rakesh Ankit, ‘Jayaprakash Narayan, Indian National Congress 
and Party Politics, 1934-54’, Studies in Indian Politics, 3 (2), December 2015, pp. 149-63. 
47 See Paul R. Brass, ‘Leadership Conflict and the Disintegration of the Indian Socialist Movement: 
Personal Ambition, Power and Policy’, The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 14: 1 
(1976), pp. 19-41. 
48 The Indian Nation, Sunday June 23, 1968, p. 4. 
49 H.R. Dua, ‘the spread of English in India: Politics of Language Conflict and Language Power’, in 
Fishman, Conrad and Rubal-Lopez (eds.) Post-Imperial English (Berlin, 1996), pp. 564-65. 
50 See Rajni Kothari, ‘The Political Change of 1967’, EPW, Volume 6, No. 3/5, pp. 231-250. 
51 The Indian Nation, Monday March 6, 1967, pp. 1-4.  
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from the Backward Classes to become Chief Minister’ and B. P. Shastri – the first person 
from the Scheduled Castes to become Chief Minister – mid-term elections were held in 
1969 and the Scheduled Castes continued to move away from the Congress.52 The 
number of their MPs in Congress (15) was now equal to those in Samyukta Socialist 
Party (13) and Praja Socialist Party (2) combined. Later, the pro-Janata wave of 1977 saw 
the Congress being reduced to 2/45 in the reserved constituencies.  
 
However, in the elections held after the Bangladesh war in 1972 and after the fall of the 
Janata experiment in 1980, the Congress recovered. Similarly, after the assassination of 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984, the sympathy vote saw the figures 
regaining the heights of the 1950s in the 1985 elections. But, by/through the 1990s, 
Janata Dal/Rashtriya Janata Dal replaced the Congress in the vanguard of the political 
movement of the backward groups. Thus, the importance of that 1967 elections in Bihar’s 
socio-political history can be gauged from the fact that it was that particular election, 
which ‘brought in a coalition [politics] setting urban disillusionment/apathy and rural 
splinter-ism/assertion’.53 Albeit, in the short-term, as The Indian Nation opined in 1968: 
‘There is one word to describe the present state of Bihar politics – ramshackle’.54 By 
now, the major demands of the Backward and Dalit movements, removal of 
untouchability and reservation in government jobs, had been given a constitutional 
framework by the 1950s-60s, though their execution had been far from satisfactory.55 
Nevertheless, since independence, a middle class among intermediate castes had 
emerged. Writing prophetically, The Indian Nation warned the Congress in early 1972 
that: 
 
Politically conscious backward castes, classes [and] tribals are struggling for recognition and 
representation and Congress’ drive for ‘social justice’ must embrace them. The coalition 
politics from ’67 to ’72 was an unstable disillusionary phase and Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s 
golden period of ’71- 72 has brought back stability in Bihar but complex social undercurrents 
should not be neglected.56  
 
The 1974 JP movement was to be the watershed,57 which decisively turned this class 
away from the Congress. As well-known, almost all of the later political leaders of the 
1990s were a product of this movement. The Naxalite Movement, on the other hand, 
emerged from the ideological struggle and splits within the Indian Communist 
Movement.58 By early 1970s, the Naxalite Movement was losing support in the rest of 
the country but in Bihar, it continued till about 1976,59 even leading ‘the Harijans of the 
Patna area’.60 By the early 1980s, a ‘Naxalite Belt’ would emerge in Bhojpur, Patna, 
                                                 
52 See Sanjay Ruparelia, Divided we govern: Coalition Politics in Modern India (OUP, 2015). 
53 The Searchlight, Sunday March 5, 1972, Page 6. 
54 The Indian Nation, Sunday June 30, 1968, Page 4. 
55 See Christophe Jaffrelot, Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste (Orient 
Blackswan, 2006).  
56 The Indian Nation, Thursday March 23, 1972, Page 4. 
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Gaya and Aurangabad. Later, however, they would have to contend with Lalu Prasad 
Yadav, who would boast:  
 
I have proven that ballot boxes are more powerful than machine guns. Votes can decide 
whether a man will be in the dust or riding in an airplane. I am a true Naxalite [militant, 
communist revolutionary], from birth, a democratic Naxalite.61 
 
His revolution would remain ‘incomplete’, by getting reframed as ‘Yadav Raj’.62 Even 
so, every failed revolution has its socio-political consequences, especially a 
democratisation of socio-political space that enhanced subsequent mobilisation on the 
larger issues of public interest.  
 
1967 to 1989: The fall, rise and eclipse of Congress 
 
The period from 1967 saw the social movement of the Backwards reaching the corridors 
of power for the first time. In the next four years, Bihar had five chief Ministers (CMs) 
from the Backward Castes, two Scheduled Caste CMs, as well as the only Backward 
Caste minister from Congress. Between 1967 and 1972, Bihar had nine governments, 
including ones that lasted as briefly as for three days and nine days. However, the 
accessions of these ‘backward caste/scheduled caste ministers’ had been the result of 
political compromise and did not alter the social vantage. The single most significant 
piece of social legislation for the Backward Castes, in this period, was the decision of 
Karpoori Thakur, as Education Minister in the Samvid Sarkar (1967-69), to abolish 
English education from school and college curriculum as well as to abolish its 
requirement in institutes of higher education. This led to a dramatic change in the social 
composition of institutes of higher education, with an influx of students from rural areas 
and Backward Castes, and a rise of the ‘forward among the backwards’ (Yadavas, 
Kurmis, Koeris). In contrast, Congress’ cohort of landed, educated and contracted elite 
headed by men like Harihar Singh, L. N. Mishra, Daroga Prasad Rai, Kedar Pandey and 
Abdul Ghafoor did not alter in that ‘the majority both before and after the 1969 split, 
remained with the Forwards and the Upper Backwards’.63 
 
Twenty years before Lalu Prasad Yadav polarised Bihar’s electoral scene, Jayaprakash 
Narayan (JP) had already articulated the cardinal aphorism of Bihar politics. In 1974, he 
had said, ‘Caste is the biggest political party in Bihar’.64 By now, Bihar had become the 
battlefield of the largest nation-wide student movement against Indira Gandhi’s rule, led 
by the Bihar Chhatra Sangharsh Samiti, fed by popular alienation among the urban 
middle classes against the Congress, and supported by the student fronts of Jan Sangh 
and Samyukta Socialist Party. The Indian Nation had written in January 1974, of ‘back-
breaking prices, acute shortage of essential commodities, galloping inflation, mounting 
unemployment and virtual economic stagnation. However, the opposition could not make 
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any substantial gains as they had neither the ability nor the leadership’.65 Now, helmed by 
JP, it became a nation-wide popular campaign. Initially, it had an eight-point agenda 
involving student union rights, provision of vocational education, bank loans for 
business, unemployment allowance, accommodation and scholarship, effective student 
representation, inflation, affordable food and study material. The traditional New Year 
piece of The Indian Nation in 1975 attempted to capture the ambiguity in this period:  
 
1974 was a year of processions and demonstrations, trials and tribulations, conflicts and 
confrontations for Bihar. It gave a shock treatment to the party in power, which had been 
fleecing the people. Significantly, the agitation took wings and spread over other parts of the 
country posing the first-ever serious threat to the party in power. Whether that would 
strengthen or weaken the country is a matter of opinion.66  
 
Among other burning issues, the inflation rate reached 30% by August 1974 and there 
was outrage against the political murders which had become prevalent in Bihar from 
early 1970s, viz., those of freedom-fighter Suraj Narain Singh on 21 April 1973 and the 
then-Union Railway Minister Lalit Narayan Mishra on 2 February 1975.67 Between 1971 
and 1981, Bihar saw ‘an average of 178 Ordinances compared to 15 Legislations’ and 
between 1966-7 and 1977-8, the state’s growth rate was 2.5%. After 34 years of planning, 
Bihar was ‘at the bottom’.68 Despite not being expressly centred on the social questions 
of caste, this movement provided a boost to the process of the shifting of power and 
proved to be a training ground for the new breed of leaders. Just as the older generation 
of leaders had the reference of the struggle for ‘first independence’; the new leaders now 
had the reference of the ‘second freedom’.69 However, ‘the tragedy of 1974’, was 
pronounced by contemporary commentary as,  
 
…a double whammy: the government failed to protect the people; the opposition failed to 
give a right direction to the movement, which launched an orgy of violence shaking the 
conscience of people and nerves of the government. Ideally it should have happened the 
other way around.70  
 
Nevertheless, the seeds of the politics of 1990s were sown in this social movement of the 
1970s. As the poet Nagarjuna wrote, ‘The decline of Bihar is not a story of yesterday. 
Actually, [since] history remains invisible to the common people therefore they start 
losing hope’.71 The elections of 1977 were a disaster for Congress with no Lok Sabha 
seats from Bihar and only 57 out of 324 seats in the state assembly. It had been clear for 
some time that ‘the flabby Congress, deeply involved in power politics, held only a 
tenuous touch with the masses as a result of its weakened base’.72 The party managed 
only a 23.5% share of the vote, an all-time low. But of greater significance is the caste 
composition of its 57 MLAs. Yadavs for the first time headed the list with 10, edging out 
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the Brahmans (9), followed by the Rajputs (7), Bhumihars (6) and Koeris (4) and Kurmis 
(2). This was against the backdrop of the 1975-77 ministry of the maithil Brahman, 
Jagannath Mishra. But, the danger of empty and negative, anti-incumbency politics was 
not lost on all, amidst the widespread euphoria at the ouster of the Congress party from 
the corridors of power. The hollowness of the ‘Janata Wave’ was remarked upon thus:  
 
The Janata wave was a natural outcome of the repression let loose in the country. Emergency 
had choked the people and, their mute struggle threw the political dictatorship, once they 
became fully awake and sat up, but beyond that, the JP Janata wave is no more on the move 
because it could not [be].73  
 
It was not long before disillusionment with the new non-Congress regime set in. Three 
months into the new government and a sense of helplessness can be detected as The 
Searchlight declared that ‘as long as narrowness prevails, governments may change, but 
things will not improve.74 By then, Karpoori Thakur had formed his Janata Ministry on 
22 June 1977 and on 9 March 1978 decided to implement the 25% reservation for the 
Other Backward Classes in government services. The second major decision of the 
government was to hold Panchayat elections. Held amidst widespread election violence, 
these broke the traditional dominance of the upper-castes in local government forever. 
Unsurprisingly, Thakur’s government was brought down in April 1979 and Ram Sunder 
Das succeeded him and formed a cabinet, which had more than 50% of its ministers from 
upper castes. Das did not last long either. By January 1980, Indira Gandhi was back in 
power and she dismissed his ministry on 18 February 1980. The non-Congress forces 
were divided in the state and Congress came back to power in Bihar with 167 seats and 
34.17% of the votes; figures that increased to 196 and 38.62% respectively in 1985. Even 
the number of Scheduled Caste MLAs rose to respectable figures (24/48 and 33/48), but 
these should not be construed as indicators of their return to the Congress’ fold.75 The 
decade of the 1980s in general and the two years of 1988-9, in particular, with four CMs, 
witnessed incredible episodes of anarchy and violence, unprecedented misrule and 
opportunist vote bank politics, led the way for a permanent eclipse of Congress rule in 
Bihar and made it easier for anti-Congress groups to succeed. Certainly as another 
editorial in The Indian Nation put it: 
 
…the schizophrenic Congress [had] made both democratic politics and democratic 
governance meaningless. But which brand of change? The Jan Sangh brand? The Socialist 
brand? The Congress (O) brand? A mixture? This question remains unanswered…76  
 
The Congress in the 1980s was still installing upper-caste CMs; three were Brahmins and 
two Thakurs. The backward groups, meanwhile, continued towards their goal of political 
representation and power. At the outset of this period in the 1967 elections, there had 
been 82 Backward Caste MLAs compared to their 133 caste counterparts. By 1989, there 
were 90 Backward Caste MLAs and their caste adversaries had come down to 118. 
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During this time, national issues like the Bangladesh war, the emergency and the 
following election, the squabbling and short-lived Janata government the sympathy factor 
after Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination had overshadowed the question of empowerment of the 
backwards. Therefore, in this period in the legislative assembly, the representation of the 
backwards remained steady without being spectacular. But, by the 1990 election, 
backward empowerment had become the only question. This is best illustrated by the 
‘political odyssey of Karpoori Thakur after the 1980 elections until his death in 1988’, 
which saw: 
 
…the emergence of two contradictory potentialities in the consolidation of larger political 
identities within the framework of the division between the Backward Classes and Forward 
Castes. Over all, the larger caste categories, i.e., forward and backward, were strengthened as 
the basic units of political identity. At the same time, within the Backward Classes, divisions 
emerged along class lines which simultaneously created an attrition in “Backward” strength, 
and opened up the potentiality of a broader coalition of the poor.77 
 
Moreover, between 1972 and 1990, there was a rise of armed rebel groups, which played 
a major part in breaking the dominance of the upper castes. Two prominent rebel leaders 
of this period were Mohan Bind in the Kaimur region and Kailash Mandal in Diayara 
area. The Hindustan Weekly noted in its 22 December 1991 issue that, ‘The 
criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of criminals have turned Bihar into the 
largest arena of political violence’.78 The Hindustan Times wrote on 10 January 1992 
that, ‘Violence has become the way of life in Bihar. Bihar has become the test-tube of the 
ironies of India’.79 Between 1980 and 1986, ‘there had been more political murders in 
Bihar than in Punjab’, resulting in “warlordism”/”second serfdom”, while resulting from 
‘decreasing effectiveness of government and the erosion of established patterns of 
domination in Bihar’s predominantly agrarian society’.80  
 
The ‘turmoil in Bihar’ was seen as ‘a product of two related but independent struggles: a 
political struggle for control of the state pitting the forward castes against the backward 
castes, and a socio-economic struggle of the landless lower castes against the land-
owning forward and backward castes’. The ‘always factionalised’ political elite of Bihar 
– whether Brahmans, Kayasths, Bhumihars, Rajputs or Yadavs, Koeris and Kurmis – 
always sought ‘a correlation among high status, landownership and political power’. This 
superbly summed ‘circulation of elites’ thrived on ‘co-option’, starting with the ‘middle 
peasantry’. By late-1980s, government ineffectiveness, party disarray and power conflict 
that had been increasing since 1967, was completed by a going together of ‘ballot and 
bullet’. This ‘democracy by gun’ saw the anti-Indira rebellion, the emergency, Jagannath 
Mishra’s ‘dark period’ – violent incidents increased from 260 in 1977 to 617 in 1984, 
nearly 100 people were killed in the 1985 election, compared with 34 in 1977, including 
4 candidates – and Rajputs, Bhumihars and Kayasths move away from the Congress.  
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In the 1980s, ‘professionalism of the police [was] snuffed out by political interference 
[and] personalism’. And among personalities and private armies, ‘both politically and 
social, Karpoori Thakur symbolised a new phase in Bihar’s politics: the simultaneous 
consolidation of an alternative to Congress and the political rise of the backward castes’ – 
one of Harry Blair’s ‘rising kulaks’.81 While often seen as personifying ‘the organisation 
of the poor in a double assault on the caste system and the class structure’, ‘it is important 
to note that Thakur did not win the 1977 poll solely or even mostly on the basis of his 
backward leadership; rather it was anti-Congress sentiment’. Karpoori Thakur himself 
acknowledged that ‘the main enemy was not the forward castes but the Congress party’. 
And yet, between 1988 and 1989, Bihar had four Brahman chief ministers, under whose 
ineffectual-ism rose caste armies like the Lorik Sena (Bhumihars), the Kunwar Sena 
(Rajputs), the Lal Sena (landless labourers) and the “Naxalite parallel government” in 
parts of the state. This culminated the long history of agrarian struggles in Bihar starting 
from tenant against landlords and ending with ‘caste-class conflict, police brutality, 
anarchic conflict, dacoity and criminal violence’. In June 1985, after the so-called 
Operation Black Panther, the state conceded that ‘Gaya, Aurangabad, Patna, Bhojpur, 
Rohtas, Munger, Bhagalpur, West and East Champaran were extremist-dominated 
areas’.82 No wonder, Jagannath Mishra prophesied in 1986 thus:  
 
The poor are being neglected by all parties. My own party is losing support among the SC 
and the ST. The old left has also lost the initiative. Politics, however, does not like a vacuum. 
Someone will move in.83 
 
The Advent of Lalu Prasad Yadav 
 
Karpoori Thakur died an untimely death in 1988. By then, ambitious and younger Yadav 
legislators had already harassed and undermined him to the point of exhaustion, 
particularly the trinity of Anoop Lal, Srinarayan and Lalu Prasad Yadav. They 
collaborated with the Speaker of the State Assembly, Shiv Chandra Jha,84 and had 
Thakur removed from the post of leader of opposition in a dubious episode. The void left 
by Karpoori Thakur’s ousting and death was the one, which Lalu Prasad Yadav filled 
with some luck and some help. He assumed the chair of Karpoori Thakur but neither by a 
unanimous decision nor a majority choice rather as a compromise candidate. Devi Lal 
and Sharad Yadav ensured his succession over that of Anup Lal Yadav because, among 
other reasons, the latter had invited the Brahmin Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna for a meal.  
 
The ‘Subaltern Saheb’ began his political life as the Patna University Student Union’s 
President.85 He had been a member of the student organisation committee for the 1974 
movement. He entered the Lok Sabha in 1977 and Vidhan Sabhas in 1980 and 1985, 
emerging as the leader of opposition in the latter, in 1988-89. In March 1990, he became 
the CM despite not contesting the 1990 state elections, having earlier won the Chhapra 
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Lok Sabha seat in the 1989 general elections. The 1989 Lok Sabha and 1990 Vidhan 
Sabha contests had, as their major issues, the Bofors Scandal, the corruption of Rajiv 
Gandhi’s Central Government and the permutations forged by Vishwanath Pratap Singh, 
Devi Lal, Chandrasekhar, the BJP and the Left front. But the strongest undercurrent was 
that of backward empowerment, encapsulated in the word ‘Mandal’ apart from the 
‘Mandir/Kamandal’ politics around Ayodhya Ram-temple. In the 1989 Lok Sabha 
elections, Janata Dal won 31 seats out of 54 in Bihar and for the first time the number of 
Backward Caste MPs (18) (Yadavs (11), Kurmis (3), Koeris (4)) was equal to that of 
upper caste MPs (18). This issue of backward empowerment became even more 
important in the 1990 Vidhan Sabha elections. Janata Dal emerged victorious with 121 
seats leaving behind Congress (71), BJP (39), CPI (23), CPM (6), and JMM (19). 
Independents also emerged as a major force having won 30 seats.  
 
While in 1990 there were 117 Backward Caste MLAs as against 105 upper caste MLAs, 
by 1995 there were 161 Backward Caste MLAs as against 56 upper caste MLAs. The 
composition among the four ‘forward among backward’ castes in these two elections was 
as follows: 1990: Yadavs (63), Kurmis (18), Banias (16), and Koeris (12); 1995: Yadavs 
(86), Kurmis (27), Banias (18), and Koeris (13). In the 1991 Lok Sabha elections, there 
were 24 backward castes MPs in all – Yadavs (13), Kurmis (6), Banias (1) and Koeris 
(4). These three elections thus saw a conclusive displacement of the upper-castes from 
the corridors of political power at the hands of the ‘forward among backward’ castes. 
Analysing the reasons for the defeat of the Congress, The Indian Nation on 2 March and 
6 March 1990, identified, ‘Lost goodwill, tarnished image, useless tactics, need for 
strategy and rebels’.86 In a hard-hitting editorial on 3 March 1990, The Hindustan Times 
gave its own verdict: 
 
The image of its leadership, indefinite postponement of organizational elections, and the 
arrogance of power on the part of leaders at different levels, factional squabbles and frequent 
change of CMs by the High Command had done incalculable harm to the party.87  
 
The next seven days had elements of high drama as a row over the Bihar Janata Dal (JD) 
leadership came out in the open. A keen tussle developed between Ram Sunder Das, Lalu 
Prasad Yadav and Raghunath Jha. The Sunday edition of 4 March 1990 of The Hindustan 
Times almost anointed Ram Sunder Das as the next leader and provided the inevitable 
reason for it:  
 
Coalition government in Bihar [is] likely to be headed by Ram Sunder Das who is emerging 
as a consensus candidate - Mr. Laloo Yadav’s casteist image, his inexperience [and] his 
attempt to dominate the party with anti-social elements, plus the fact that [the] neighbouring 
Uttar Pradesh has a Yadav Chief Minister have militated against his serious candidature.88 
 
Lalu Prasad Yadav’s candidature became public only on 5 March 1990 and a serious 
challenge was mounted over the next two days. He claimed the support of 79 MLAs, 
mostly those from the old guard of the Lok Dal and the Karpoori Thakur group. The 
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situation was so chaotic that a fourth candidate, Anoop Lal Yadav, announced his bid the 
next day.89 Finally in the leadership contest held on 7 March 1990, Lalu Prasad Yadav 
(58 votes) defeated Ram Sunder Das (54) and Raghunath Jha (14). The victor was the 
candidate of Devi Lal, Sharad Yadav, Nitish Kumar and Jagdanand camp, while VP 
Singh and George Fernandes supported Ram Sunder Das and Chandrasekhar had put up 
Raghunath Jha. On 10 March 1990, the new CM took oath in public at the sprawling 
Gandhi Maidan. The early image of himself, which he sought to cultivate was that of a 
‘leader of the people’:  
 
After a difficult election Laloo Yadav heads an unsteady coalition government, a difficult 
administration and the greenhorn CM - already being hailed as a “leader of the people” - 
would have to prove that he has the wherewithal to lead a government, if it has to last 
long...90  
 
Proving everyone wrong, the incumbent went on to rule Bihar for fifteen years, first and 
foremost, as an aggressive representative of the drive for backward empowerment. This 
was his power, but this also provided an intrinsic limit to his power. His ability to 
‘connect’ with his social and electoral base and his projection of his personality as his 
politics were a symbol of pride for them. Even before him, there had been lower or 
Scheduled Caste CMs, but they had not personified empowerment, barring Karpoori 
Thakur. Lalu Prasad Yadav, the grassroot Lohiaite, hardened by JP’s Total Revolution, 
became the prince of social justice and secularism in power. His 
 
…arrest of the Hindu nationalist L.K. Advani and the stopping of his Rath Yatra, firm 
handling of communal riots, combined with his strong opposition to upper caste hegemony 
with his characteristic native wit and rustic wisdom, made him tremendously popular among 
the Muslims (and lower caste Hindus). His electoral equation, Muslim-Yadav, became the 
famous mantra for his subsequent electoral successes.91 
 
He gave his constituency; the Backwards and Muslims, a hitherto unprecedented sense of 
belonging and dignity by making them believe that he was their man, ruling on their 
behalf, for their benefit. He, then, brilliantly employed it by his knowledge of the nature 
of caste antipathies, social estrangements and constituency arithmetic. Once installed, he 
went about creating an iconoclastic image of the ‘common Chief Minister’. In the 
process, neither did he have to nor did he wish to govern Bihar in order to rule it;92 the 
twin themes of Mandal and Mandir,93 giving him an electoral ascendancy that the need 
for performance fell by the wayside. He emerged as a popular anti-establishment 
underdog and a rustic messiah. Among the heterogeneous caste/class groups within the 
Backwards, the economically rich and politically influential Yadavs (the so-called 
creamy layer) cornered most of the benefits of the ‘Lalu Raj’, while the larger mass of 
Backwards remained poor. But, they supported Lalu Prasad Yadav till 2005 because he 
provided them with a sense of pride and participation. 
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Politics is an act of self-location. Lalu Prasad Yadav loomed large because he emerged at 
a particular historical conjunction. With his advent, also emerged the ‘backwards among 
the backwards’. The one real change Lalu Yadav brought was a change of the caste 
character of the exploitative order. He gave the Backwards a sense of political 
participation and the Muslims a qualified sense of security in fractured times.94 He undid 
the hegemony of the upper castes and installed his own. He was a product of Caste and 
not its producer. Political violence and electoral malpractice in Bihar much predated him 
and his constituency had long been the victims.95 Be it corruption or political crime, caste 
war or anarchy, the Congress had set the precedents. Lalu Prasad Yadav was a 
response.96  
 
In the process, by mid-1990s, ‘the killing fields of Bihar…the site of persistent warfare 
against the poor, the weak, and the exploited of the rural countryside’ had descended in 
‘the seven years of Lalu Prasad Yadav’s chief ministership as the populist champion of 
the poor, into “administrative atrophy” and “anarchy”’. Besieged by fodder scam charges, 
while Lalu Prasad Yadav was battling his (lack of) ‘right or suitability to continue’ as 
president of his party and chief minister of his state, the state seemed ‘on the verge of 
infrastructural collapse at the most fundamental levels of administering a civil society’. 
Lalu had an unvarnished and unrestrained ‘social justice theme’ in his first term, ‘of 
assuring izzat i.e., self-respect to the socially and economically deprived of the land’.97 
Deep into his second term (completed by his wife Rabri), ‘the political calculus [showed] 
splits in the backward caste, untouchable-Dalit, and Muslim alliance which Lalu had 
crafted so brilliantly before and after the 1990 and 1991 elections’. As Mohammad Sajjad 
has shown, ‘Muslim society also underwent change in challenging upper caste hegemony 
[during] Lalu Yadav’s Chief Ministerial tenure. The Momins/Ansaris, the Rayeens, the 
Kulhaiyas, Pamarias and the Bhatiyaras mobilised their caste groups for access to social 
justice, not only reservations…but also a share in political power’.98 In his ally-turned-
opponent, Syed Shahabuddin’s words:  
 
For Lalu Yadav, who swears by Mandal, social justice means the substitution of Bhumihar-
Rajput Raj by Yadava Raj, that is, dominance and pre-eminence of the Yadavas in every 
walk of life’ thus leading to a section of Muslims [The Pasmanda], in addition to the Koeris 
and the Kurmis, deserting Lalu.99 
 
By the turn of the century, for many, his ‘limiting “tunnel vision” reduced him to the 
status of yet another Yadav leader’. One of the visible factors for this was the brazen and 
cynical ‘Yadavisation’ of state administration, which fed ‘the formation of the Samata 
Party in 1994 by the engineer and Kurmi leader, Nitish Kumar’. In a subterranean sense, 
as shown by the historian Arvind Das, upwardly mobile middle castes and classes were 
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‘people not likely to be attracted by Lalu’s politics of poverty’, while being ‘concerned 
about a civil society of law and order of everyday life, no matter one’s social status or 
professional position’. A second ‘reality of post-Laloo dominance’ was ‘the softening of 
[his] scheduled caste-Dalit support base’. It is what has been crystallised as ‘specific 
secular and political interests, economic interests and personality interactions, which are 
decisive in determining how people vote…true for any social or religious segment of 
society; these are never unitary solidarities in any political sense’. As Walter Hauser 
proffered too:  
 
…issues of political freedom as well as economic and social freedom and the allied issues of 
social justice and self-respect have a long history in Bihar…Laloo Prasad Yadav brought the 
idea to a new level of awareness…But, the concept [went back to] Swami Sahajanand…and 
Jayaprakash Narayan, and Karpoori Thakur. And, movements like the Kisan Sabha, the 
Triveni Sangh, the Bihar Socialist Party, and the CPI, the CPI (ML). 
 
The story of Lalu Prasad Yadav then was also his transformation from being ‘the 
solution’ to becoming the problem, through the 15 years from 1990 to 2005. Since then, 
‘just as Indira was not India, so Lalu is not Bihar’.100 Nitish Kumar’s government 
‘expedited the enquiry process into the Bhagalpur riots (1989) and many aggressors 
[were] convicted. Most of these [were] Yadavs, which raised uncomfortable questions 
about Lalu’s famous mantra of the Muslim-Yadav electoral partnership’. Nitish Kumar’s 
governments have also shown ‘arguably better performance in matters of law and order, 
road construction, electric supply, reservation of seats for the EBCs and women, 15-point 
package for minorities…gestures which are looked at with some hope by the common 
Muslim communities, even though some suspicions and uncertainties do persist among 
the Muslims due to his alliance with the Hindu BJP’.101 The quest for social justice in 
Bihar then, among Backward and Scheduled Castes as well as Muslims since the 1990s 
has mystified much social commentary and ‘demystified’ many political vote-banks.102  
 
Conclusion 
 
Today, Bihar is a heartland of an estimated 100 million people, 40% of whom are below 
poverty line and 90% of whom continue to have a rural existence. They share a collective 
trajectory that can be traced to the colonial creation of rent-seeking landlords by the 
permanent settlement of 1793. That set Bihar on becoming a ‘classic enclave economy’ 
through the British Raj. Post-independence, the ‘freight equalization scheme’, an 
‘explosive mix of caste and class struggles’, ‘transfer of caste power [and] material 
benefits to [hitherto] marginalized’, a ‘deinstitutionalized state apparatus and curtailed 
development’, and, large social groups, from the 14% twice-born castes, 39% OBCs 
(20% upper OBCs, 19% lower OBCs, 12% Yadavs, 3.5% Kurmis, 4.1% Koeris), 15% 
Dalits, 16% Muslims have operated within a paradigm of continuity of caste and class 
conflict. In these seven decades, from the Congress’ ‘social coalition of extremes’ 
dominated by the upper castes, followed by first the emergence and then the 
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fragmentation of the OBCs, if Karpoori Thakur symbolised was a precursor for the 
following Lalu Prasad Yadav, then the latter personified a ‘democratic upsurge’, a 
‘plebeian politics [of] narrow-poor redistributive coalitions’. Since 2005, Nitish Kumar 
has represented a ‘wide-poor coalition [of] Dalits and upper castes’, with the 2015 Bihar 
assembly elections showing that ‘themes of identity remain central to mobilization efforts 
of political parties’.103 Indeed,  
 
…it is said that the class and caste neutral economic policies of Nitish Kumar have broad 
sub-national support, and have triggered the formation of a “Bihari” identity for the first 
time, especially after the implementation of positive discrimination for women, lower 
backwards, and the Dalits in the Panchayati Raj Institutions and [he] essentially represents 
the agglomeration of non-powerful social categories (Ati Picchra which also includes most of 
the Arzal and Ajlaf communities of Muslims, and Maha Dalits).  
 
On the other hand is the view that Nitish Kumar’s ‘governmental concern of welfare and 
development’ vis-à-vis Lalu Prasad’s ‘agenda of justice, dignity and distribution of 
governmental resources’ are complimentary to each other. One’s caste-based politics is 
matched by the other’s functional social engineering; ‘for an emancipative politics of the 
Dalits, this history holds a clue’.104 This article has tried to show that the electoral 
victories achieved from 1989 onwards and the emergence of the legend of Lalu Prasad 
Yadav represents continuity in this cycle of democratic empowerment and ‘breakdown of 
the Brahmanical social order’.105 It is another milestone on this road of identity assertion 
in Indian and Bihar politics. Bihar has always been severely limited by a deeply divided 
social structure. Since 1937, Congress adopted the strategy of dealing with these 
divisions by co-opting the elite into the power structure, providing affirmative actions for 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and increasingly the Other Backward Castes, and 
granting considerable, if conditional and contradictory, cultural autonomy to Muslims. 
This strategy left much of the ugly social reality untouched. Nevertheless, social mobility 
was always on the rise widening access to political, economic and social power. In 
democratic India, castes – as a social unit – have always been perceived as a strong 
vehicle of improving access to power and promotion of interests and it continues to 
matter.106 Increased political significance of castes has provided them a greater social 
hold. Democracy, industrialisation and an equitable economic redistribution have 
softened their edges but have not eroded their bases. In fact, they have provided an added 
economic dimension.  
 
Conflicts have plagued Bihar not so much from economic deprivation, but a deep sense 
of exclusion and marginality along caste-lines, which must be moderated as much by 
means of a social transformation as by economic development. The question is whether 
social mobility in Bihar, having been expressed through the sphere and language of 
politics, will ultimately reflect a proper economic dimension – a new ‘social contract’ – 
what Witsoe’s alternatively calls ‘popular sovereignty’: ‘the experience of local power’ 
and ‘everyday interactions with state institutions’ that revolved around ‘dignity’; a 
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democratic demand that ‘verily characterizes India’s postcolonial democracy’.107 It was a 
question that had first emerged during the Janeyu Movement during the 1920s and then 
evolved during the tetchy relationship between the Indian National Congress and the 
Triveni Sangh between the 1930s and 1950s. Having surveyed that, the article then 
showed the rise, fall and eclipse of the Socialists and the Congress on the caste question 
for two decades from the 1960s, especially 1967, and thereby set the historical scene for 
the advent of Lalu Prasad Yadav. Like many era-inaugurating events, hindsight has since 
distorted our understanding of this process, akin to Borges’ ‘forking paths’ or, closer 
home, ‘changing rivers’ in the heartland of Bihar, whose saga is one of resurrection.108 
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